From Solari MoneyChanger Calculator:
…when you pay another person in silver or gold, you are giving them real value and substance rather than merely handing off the hot potato of paper money and Federal Credit. Talk about “coming clean!”

Don’t know what they’re talking about? Listen to Episode #68 of The American View. In the meantime, I’m going to find out what my salary really is…

Kudos to the many brave souls blowing the whistle on the U.S. Government’s illegal domestic spying programs! Some of the more recent examples include:

• Daily Kos: All About NSA’s and AT&T’s Big Brother Machine, the Narus 6400
• Wired News: Wiretap Whistle-Blower’s Account (excerpt from this is below:)

In 2002, when I was working in an AT&T office in San Francisco, the site manager told me to expect a visit from a National Security Agency agent, who was to interview a management-level technician for a special job. The agent came, and by chance I met him and directed him to the appropriate people.

In January 2003, I, along with others, toured the AT&T central office on Folsom Street in San Francisco — actually three floors of an SBC building. There I saw a new room being built adjacent to the 4ESS switch room where the public’s phone calls are routed. I learned that the person whom the NSA interviewed for the secret job was the person working to install equipment in this room. The regular technician work force was not allowed in the room.

In October 2003, the company transferred me to the San Francisco building to oversee the Worldnet Internet room, which included large routers, racks of modems for customers’ dial-in services, and other equipment. I was responsible for troubleshooting problems on the fiber optic circuits and installing new circuits.

While doing my job, I learned that fiber optic cables from the secret room were tapping into the Worldnet circuits by splitting off a portion of the light signal. I saw this in a design document available to me, entitled “Study Group 3, LGX/Splitter Wiring, San Francisco” dated Dec. 10, 2002. I also saw design documents dated Jan. 13, 2004 and Jan. 24, 2003, which instructed technicians on connecting some of the already in-service circuits to the “splitter” cabinet, which diverts some of the light signal to the secret room. The circuits listed were the Peering Links, which connect Worldnet with other networks and hence the whole country, as well as the rest of the world.

One of the documents listed the equipment installed in the secret room, and this list included a Narus STA 6400, which is a “Semantic Traffic Analyzer”. The Narus STA technology is known to be used particularly by government intelligence agencies because of its ability to sift through large amounts of data looking for preprogrammed targets. The company’s advertising boasts that its technology “captures comprehensive customer usage data … and transforms it into actionable information…. (It) provides complete visibility for all internet applications.”

My job required me to connect new circuits to the “splitter” cabinet and get them up and running. While working on a particularly difficult one with a technician back East, I learned that other such “splitter” cabinets were being installed in other cities, including Seattle, San Jose, Los Angeles and San Diego.

(HT: Aaron at TheNotSoFreeState, for one…)

UPDATE: Ooh! Here’s another, from The New Yorker:

But the point, obviously, was to identify terrorists. �After you hit something, you have to figure out what to do with it,� the Administration intelligence official told me. The next step, theoretically, could have been to get a suspect�s name and go to the fisa court for a warrant to listen in. One problem, however, was the volume and the ambiguity of the data that had already been generated. (�There�s too many calls and not enough judges in the world,� the former senior intelligence official said.) The agency would also have had to reveal how far it had gone, and how many Americans were involved. And there was a risk that the court could shut down the program.

Instead, the N.S.A. began, in some cases, to eavesdrop on callers (often using computers to listen for key words) or to investigate them using traditional police methods. A government consultant told me that tens of thousands of Americans had had their calls monitored in one way or the other. �In the old days, you needed probable cause to listen in,� the consultant explained. �But you could not listen in to generate probable cause. What they�re doing is a violation of the spirit of the law.� One C.I.A. officer told me that the Administration, by not approaching the FISA court early on, had made it much harder to go to the court later.